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CORRELATIVE OBLIGATION IN PATENT LAW:  
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC GOOD IN DEFINING THE LIMITS 
OF PATENT EXCLUSIVITY 
SRIVIDHYA RAGAVAN* 
In light of the recent outrageous price-spiking of pharmaceuticals, this Article 
questions the underlying justifications for exclusive rights conferred by the grant 
of a patent. Traditionally, patents are defined as property rights granted to 
encourage desirable innovation. This definition is a misfit as treating patents as 
property rights does a poor job of defining the limits of the patent rights as well 
as the public benefit goals of the system. This misfit gradually caused an 
imbalance in the rights versus duties construct within patent law. After a 
thorough analysis of the historical and philosophical perspectives of patent 
exclusivity, this Article concludes that the extent of exclusivity that patent 
monopoly currently bestows is unsupported by the philosophy of patent exclusivity 
that asserts strong public benefits. Alternatively, this Article presents the law of 
contracts as embodying a framework within which patent law can fit better. By 
viewing the grant of a patent as a contract with the government in exchange for 
the patent holder providing a benefit to society, patent owners shall have duties to 
the society that correspond to their rights under the patent. 
* Srividhya Ragavan serves as a Professor of Law at the Texas A&M University School of
Law. She is the author of the monograph PATENTS AND TRADE DISPARITIES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, Oxford University Press, 2012. She has also co-published (with Irene Calboli) 
DIVERSITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IDENTITIES, INTERESTS AND INTERSECTIONS, with 
Cambridge University Press, 2015.  The author acknowledges that the paper has benefitted from 
thoughtful comments of several colleagues and wishes to thank Professors Peter Yu, Jay Kesan, 
Peter Lee, Saurabh Vishnubakth, Sarah Burstein, Timothy Holbrook and Stephen Henderson for 
their thoughtful comments. A special thanks to Mr. Erwin Cartwright for his work inputs on the 
paper.    
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INTRODUCTION 
Of all the thieves, robbers, murderers and rapists, one man emerged the 
“most hated man in America” in the year 2015. That man was Martin Shkreli, the 
Chief Executive of Turing Pharmaceuticals, and his infamy was a direct reaction to 
raising the price of Daraprim, a generic drug originally developed in the 1950s, by 
5000%.1 Although the patent on the Turing drug had expired, the price of 
pharmaceuticals in patent monopoly contexts continues to represent a significant 
international debate. The price of pharmaceuticals is an important election issue in 
the United States. In January 2016, fifty Democratic members of the House, led by 
Representative Lloyd Doggett of Texas, urged government agencies to consider 
diluting or diminishing the exclusive rights over patents on pharmaceuticals.2 
While the pharmaceutical industry denounced reductions in patent exclusivity as 
arbitrary on the grounds that they would stifle innovation, non-governmental 
organizations and the public seemed broadly in favor.3 At the center of this debate 
is the role of the exclusivity conferred by the grant of a patent. Contemporary 
issues involving patent law have struggled to define the limits of patent exclusivity 
1 Zakir Thomas, Martin Shkreli: The Man of the (Pharma) Year 2015, SPICYIP (Jan. 15, 
2016), http://spicyip.com/2016/01/guest-post-martin-shkreli-the-man-of-the-pharma-year-2015. 
html.  
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in the context of addressing the ability of patents to deliver the purported objective 
of public benefit. The effect of patent trolls on innovation, access to essential 
medicines, and exclusive rights on basic research tools are a mere sample of issues 
that have raised doubts regarding the patent system’s ability to serve its 
preordained promise of public benefit.4 In all, the quest for a patent system that 
serves to encourage desirable innovation without imposing undue social cost is 
ongoing, and its end remains elusive.  
Traditionally, scholarly discussions on the limits of patent exclusivity posit 
patents in functional terms. That is, patents are defined as property rights granted 
to encourage desirable innovation. The system was designed to capture the 
objective of enhancing public benefit by incentivizing creativity without imposing 
undue social cost. However, positing patent law within the property framework has 
been used to support a notion that the patent system is functioning to ultimately 
achieve its objectives.5 Scholars and even courts rely on a property rhetoric to 
sustain the patent system.6 Generally, the property based conception of patents has 
had the laudatory impact of working towards a system that results in more patents, 
which is decoded as more innovation, which, in turn, is discerned as an increase in 
public benefit.7 Such a perception of patents has beneficially encapsulated patent 
law with the appealing sheen of producing public benefit.8  
4 See Electronic Frontier Foundation: Defending Your Rights in the Digital World, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-patent-troll-victims (last visited Sept. 2, 
2016); see also James Bessen, The Evidence Is In: Patent Trolls Do Hurt Innovation, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Nov. 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/the-evidence-is-in-patent-trolls-do-hurt-innova 
tion. See generally Robert L. Stoll, Patent Trolls: Friend or Foe, WIPO MAGAZINE (Apr. 2014), 
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2014/02/article_0007.html; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
5 See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY, 168, 169 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); Horne v. Dept. of 
Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2441-43 (2015) (holding that the Takings Clause imposes a “categorical 
duty” on the government to pay just compensation whether it takes personal or real property, 
thereby overruling the Ninth Circuit, which had previously held that personal property receives 
less protection under the Takings Clause than real property); see also Adam Mossoff, Patents as 
Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 
87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 689 (2007). 
6 Id. 
7 See, e.g., Harold Wegner, China Leads Top Five Patent Filing Countries, LAIPLA (Mar. 13, 
2016), http://www.laipla.net/china-leads-top-five-patent-filing-countries/; see also Jason 
Rantanen, US Patent Application Filings for FY 2015, PATENTLYO (Oct. 15, 2016), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/10/patent-application-filings.html. 
8 See John C. Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 649, 649-
79 (1947); see also David Kestenbaum, Evaluating The Benefits And Costs Of Patents, 
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This paper asserts that patent law is a misfit within the traditional property 
regime. That is, the prevailing notions of patents as an extension of property rights 
lead one to construe patents in terms of rights rather than obligations. Property law 
posits rights in correlative terms and thus, defines rights from the perspective of 
the duty of third parties. Thus, acquisition of patent rights signals a societal duty to 
forbear from the patented invention. However, the property-based construct of 
patents does a poor job of defining the limits of the rights. As such, patent law 
lacks a clear outline or measure of the patent owner’s duties corresponding to the 
rights.  
For instance, property regimes, rarely, if ever, provide for absolute 
ownership. While Blackstone may have touted an Englishman’s “sole and despotic 
dominion” over his land, ownership over real property is regularly subject to public 
interests.9 Eminent domain and government regulations over private property serve 
as examples of how public interests limit private property. Thus, in real property 
law, the components of ownership and the ensuing exclusivity have clear limits 
and are tied to the larger goals of establishing societal orderliness. In contrast, 
contemporary patent law struggles with defining the outer limits of patent 
exclusivity.10 Importantly, over time, it has resulted in a lack of correlation or 
proportionality between exclusive rights and the public benefit goals it seeks to 
achieve.11 For example, a patent owner has limited duties in return for acquiring 
the exclusionary rights. The patent owner has no direct duty towards securing the 
end of public benefit, save for the disclosure. The patent mechanism does not 
clearly define whether, and if so, when, public interest considerations supersede 
the private rights of the patent owner. For example, a pharmaceutical patent owner 
does not have a duty to institute access-enabling mechanisms.12 Even during a 
                                                          
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (July 17, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/07/17/332205119/evaluating 
-the-benefits-and-costs-of-patents (discussing the costs and benefits of patents). 
9 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (“[T]he right of property; or that sole and 
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in 
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”). 
10 See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 30-70 (2008) (asserting and outlining 
the ways in which patent laws do not work well with property rights). 
11 See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 150 (2011) [hereinafter, 
JUSTIFYING IP] (discussing the role of proportionality).  
12 See 35 U.S.C. § 271; Thomas F. Maffei, The Patent Misuse Doctrine: A Balance of Patent 
Rights and the Public Interest, 1 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 178 (1970); see also 
Stedman, supra note 8, at 649-79; Jeanne C. Fromer, Should The Law Care Why Intellectual 
Property Rights Have Been Asserted?, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 549 (2015). 
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public health crisis, a patent owner is not legally obligated to price differentially or 
license the patent, voluntarily or compulsorily.13 While patent owners have a duty 
to honor a state’s power of eminent domain, the practice of compulsory licensing 
has been controversial.14 Thus, under the current structure, the obligation of patent 
owners in the context of the larger goals of the system is unclear. A lack of clear 
limits, this paper highlights, has caused an imbalance in the rights versus duties 
construct within patent law. It has also blurred the lines that define the public 
benefit goals of the system.  
This shift in rhetoric towards a rights-centric approach has resulted in a more 
Blackstonian view of patent protection, causing patent law to move away from the 
public benefit goals of the system. Consequently, instrumental elements of the 
patent system have coalesced to predominantly protect the inventor. In turn, public 
benefit aspects of the system have been relegated to the status of a by-product. 
Patent law has long suffered from a lack of a realistic scale to measure its output, 
which has led to technical measures such as the number of patents to become 
predicates of its outcome. Slowly, patent disclosures increasingly became 
perceived as the sole exchange for gaining exclusivity. Disclosure has come to be 
treated as the singular constituent element that delivers the objectives of the 
system.15 The resulting tendency is to treat quantitative measures – the number of 
patents issued – as a proxy for desirable innovation that is presumed to benefit the 
public. Consequently, more private property has come to denote more public 
benefit. That is perhaps why more patents are generally considered desirable. We 
are at a point where scholars, and even courts, express their discontent over the 
quality of innovation and disclosures.16 
                                                          
13 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”). Eminent domain has always been an exception to the acquisition 
of private property, though the extension of the same principles in patent law has been much 
more controversial. 
14 Mark W. Lauroesch, General Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: Good in 
Theory, But Not Necessarily in Practice, 6 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 41 (1990); see Cole 
M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 666 (1988). 
15 See PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 213 (1996) (explaining 
that the term instrumentalism is connected with the doctrine of pragmatism which in law, refers 
to the idea of law serving as a tool, although Drahos would define the non-duty based 
instrumentalism as outlined in this paper as a form of proprietarianism).   
16 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J. dissenting) (referring to the 
low-threshold for patent eligibility to note that it has resulted in patents ranging from the 
somewhat ridiculous to the truly absurd); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 
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This paper’s main assertion is that the extent of exclusivity that patent 
monopoly currently bestows seems unsupported by the doctrinal construct of the 
philosophy behind exclusivity.17 Thus, at the outset, the discourse in this paper 
outlines the historical as well as the philosophical perspectives of patent 
exclusivity. A nuanced observation of the history of patent exclusivity reveals that 
the basic doctrinal and normative structure of patent law provides limited 
exclusivity focused on achieving the one goal of public benefit. Consequently, the 
goal of securing public benefit defines the limits of exclusivity, and by default, the 
patent system. That is, public benefit serves as the scale to measure the merits of 
the patent system.18 Such a measure directly addresses the obligation of the patent 
system and provides an outcome not only addressing the rights in patents, but more 
importantly, their limits. 
Next, the paper traces the prevailing rights over patents. The discussion 
outlines how scholars and courts historically associated patent rights as a means to 
achieve two functional ends,19 namely: (i) encouraging or incentivizing innovation 
to achieve larger public benefit goals; and (ii) disseminating information through 
disclosure.20 Over time, each of these outcomes has come to represent interrelated 
functions, regardless of whether they do or not in fact. Disclosure has come to be 
                                                          
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 641, 667-69 (2011) (asserting that unlike how it is in its current 
form, the patent document should be readable to fully perform its teaching function); see also 
Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2012, at A14; 
Benjamin N. Roin, Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2007 (2005). See generally ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND 
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2002). 
17 See David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
IN LAW 103, 104-06 (arguing that Blackstone himself “did not believe that this absolutist and 
individualist conception” of property squared with the prevailing British notions of property). 
18 See generally GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE, TEXT AND 
READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (3d ed. 2007). 
19 See Roin, supra note 16; see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU 
L. REV. 123 (2006); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 227 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pfaff 
v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (stating that the patent system should be thought of 
as “a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new 
and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of 
time”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).  
20 See Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent 
Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL’Y 273, 274-300 (1998). See 
generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARKS OFFICE, THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM: 
1790-1952 (1953).  
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interrelated with inventive presence to the extent that more disclosure has come to 
mean more inventive activities. Slowly, under the contemporary view, securing 
patent rights is implicitly considered as satisfying the twin objectives of 
encouraging innovation and disseminating information. Such a construct, this 
paper asserts, dampens the presence of a duty of the patent owner to society. 
Instead, it has posited patent grants largely within a rights paradigm, diluting the 
duty requirement of the patent holder. Slowly, the grant of a patent is presumed to 
fulfill the corresponding duty to discharge the innovation and dissemination 
objectives of the patent system. The realigned rights and duties relationship in its 
prevailing form has led to a distorted understanding of patent law divorced from its 
social responsibilities. Thus, the absoluteness of the currently prevailing form of 
rights over patents, generally attributed as a by-product of association with 
property law, is perhaps misguided.21  
Last, the paper asserts that the patent owner has a corresponding duty which 
arises from the overlay of the law of contracts on underlying patent law theories. 
The characteristic feature of contract law, on which intellectual property is heavily 
based, imposes corresponding obligations or responsibilities over the rights holder. 
The paper draws support from historic and philosophical sources of intellectual 
property law to assert that the overlay of the law of contracts on patents cannot be 
ignored. Instead, the overlay of the law of contracts is desirable because it can 
better tailor patent law to encourage innovation without undue social costs. The 
grant of monopoly rights is a contract with the government in exchange for the 
patent holder providing a benefit to society. The intrinsic nature of contract law 
imposes corresponding obligations on the rights holder. The contract necessarily 
balances granted rights with imposed corresponding obligations of the patent 
owner. That is, the patent owner would be subject to an obligation in proportion to 
the rights granted.22 Such a design would result in public benefit goals inherently 
limiting the ambit of patent exclusivity.  
The historic role of the exclusivity doctrine, from which Part I of this paper 
proceeds, is the obvious starting point to appreciate the role and architecture of the 
exclusivity doctrine in the context of the public benefit expectations. Part II 
highlights how instrumental elements of the contemporary patent regime have 
                                                          
21 See also Shubha Ghosh, Duty, Consequences, & Intellectual Property, 10 U. ST. THOMAS 
L.J. 801 (2013) (noting that the heavy reliance on utilitarianism has resulted in an approach that 
measures success based on an aggregated rather than an individualist outcome). Ghosh points out 
that a measure of success under the utilitarian theory would consider technical success first, and 
consequences second. Id. at 8.  
22 See generally MERGES, supra note 11, at 150-51. 
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suffered from an acute disconnect with the targeted objectives of the system, 
resulting in a rights-centric patent system. Next, Part III defines the ambit of the 
correlative duty to delineate the rights and obligations in the background of the 
current system. In doing so, Part III examines the kernel of the rights in patents as 
well as the source of the duty not to infringe and concludes that patent law needs to 
be reoriented from the perspective of the grant in order to achieve the public 
benefit objectives. 
I 
OF EXCLUSIVITY & PUBLIC BENEFIT 
This part explores the doctrinal core of patent exclusivity and presents a 
historical understanding of the doctrine in terms of its objectives. The historical 
orientation of patents is examined in the context of its nexus with the public benefit 
obligation. In doing so, the narrative postulates that patent exclusivity can be most 
effective when viewed from its ordained public function. Hence, patent exclusivity 
is meant to be limited by larger public benefit considerations. Disclosures, while 
serving an important role, cannot represent the sole exchange for gaining exclusive 
rights. 
A.  A Historical Overview of the Doctrine of Exclusivity 
The core of patent law’s doctrinal and normative structure can best be 
elucidated from the writings of Thomas Jefferson.23 In denying a connection 
between patent law’s proprietary underpinnings and natural rights, Jefferson 
asserts that the exclusive right to the invention is a direct return for the benefit that 
the society will derive.24 Jefferson describes the concept of stable ownership as a 
mere gift of social law as opposed to a natural right.25 Jefferson indicates that the 
exclusive right of the patent owner is not a natural right, but instead is an 
encouragement “to pursue ideas which may produce utility but this may or may not 
be done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or 
                                                          
23 But see Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought about Patents? 
Reevaluating the Patent Privilege in Historical Context, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007). 
24 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, No Patents on Ideas (Aug. 13, 1813), 
http://www.red-bean.com/kfogel/jefferson-macpherson-letter.html; Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 476 (Philip B. 
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
25 See Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 
65 n.5 (1997) (noting that Thomas Jefferson explicitly disavowed any natural-law underpinning 
of intellectual property rights). 
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complaint from anybody.”26 Thus, benefit to society is the central theme in 
Jefferson’s thinking. Jefferson emphasizes the line that segregates items for which 
society can suffer “the embarrassment of an exclusive right” from those for which 
it cannot.27 For Jefferson, products that can benefit from exclusive rights ought to 
be clearly distinguished from those that do not deserve or require such protection, 
although he acknowledges the difficulties of the exercise.28 Patent Commissioner 
Conway Coe would later rephrase the trade-off as one where “giving the inventor a 
limited amount of protection, [it] assures society of the benefits of his genius.”29 
Thus the internal core of patent law connects societal benefit to the vested 
exclusive rights.30  
The inherent dilemmas confronting the rights versus obligation question 
were captured by Thomas Jefferson in his letter to Isaac McPherson.31 Jefferson, 
himself an inventor and a draftsman of the 1793 Patent Act,32 outlined to 
McPherson in 1813 the social and economic rationale of the patent system.33 He 
wrote, “[s]ociety may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an 
encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or 
may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without 
claim or complaint from anybody.”34 The societal discretion outlined in Jefferson’s 
conception of patents creates the impression of a contract, which posits society’s 
benefit as the consideration for patent exclusivity.  
In his classical treatise on patent law, and like many other scholars after him, 
George Curtis defines patents from a contractual standpoint as a “grant by the 
government, to the author of a new and useful invention, of the exclusive right, for 
                                                          
26 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), http://www.let.rug.nl/ 
usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jefl220.php [hereinafter Letter to 
McPherson].  
27 Id. 
28 Id. (“Considering the exclusive right to invention as given not of natural right, but for the 
benefit of society, I know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are 
worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.”). 
29 See THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM: 1790-1952, supra note 20.  
30 Id.  
31 Letter to McPherson, supra note 26.  
32 See P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC. 237, 238 
(1936); see also Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1996). 
33 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 7-9. 
34 Id. at 37 n.2; see also THOMAS JEFFERSON, VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 180-81 
(Washington ed. 2013). 
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the term of invention, of practicing that invention.”35 The consideration for the 
grant, Curtis reflects, “is the benefit to the society resulting from the invention.”36 
When viewed through a contract law lens, a patent subjects an inventor to an 
obligation to provide benefits to the public in exchange for the public’s refrainment 
from the patented invention.  
The primacy of the social benefit component of patents has survived to date 
and forms an integral part of U.S. patent law. For instance, at a speech delivered 
during the Centennial Celebration of the American Patent System in 1891, W.C. 
Dodge reiterated that our patent system is based on the idea of primarily 
benefitting the public and not the inventor.37 The U.S. Supreme Court endorses the 
view that exclusivity is a sufferance self-imposed by society (designed as an award 
by the government to the inventor) to generate a larger public good. In Graham, 
the Supreme Court echoed Jefferson’s words in holding that “the patent monopoly 
was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. 
Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.”38 
Similarly, Margaret Chon argued in 1993 that James Madison, whose thinking had 
significant impact on U.S. patent law, subscribed to the view that “the public good 
fully coincides with the claims of individuals.”39 Chon discusses how Madison 
repeatedly claimed that there is no contradiction between simultaneously 
maximizing self-interest and the public good.40 Thus, the social benefit component 
of patents seems to have survived contemporary times. In sum, the societal 
tolerance of the monopoly is to encourage creation of more innovations that benefit 
society, whereas disclosures merely help make the knowledge public. Society will, 
                                                          
35 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 (2d ed. 1854). 
36 Id.  
37 James L. Ewin, The Minor Innovations of the Century, in UNITED STATES BICENTENNIAL 
COMMEMORATIVE EDITION OF PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES 478 (1892).   
38 Graham, 383 U.S. at 9 (“The grant of an exclusive right to an invention was the creation of 
society – at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas – and was not to be freely given. 
Only inventions and discoveries which furthered human knowledge, and were new and useful, 
justified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly.”).  
39 See Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent 
Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 137-38 (1993); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James 
Madison). 
40 Id. at 138.  
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for its own benefit, bear the correlative duty of tolerating the exclusive right for the 
term of the patent.41 
B.  A Philosophical Perspective of the Exclusivity Doctrine 
Against this historical background of the doctrinal core of patent exclusivity, 
the philosophy of patent exclusivity, outlined below, further asserts the strong 
public benefit underpinnings in this area of the law. The predominant focus was 
seemingly on the end objective of the system. This part highlights that whether 
from a natural rights, private, or public law perspective, patents were viewed as 
fulfilling a social benefit objective. Thus, the narrative postulates that the role of 
exclusivity was limited and confined by the larger needs of the society. In doing 
so, this section asserts that exclusivity can be most effective when viewed from 
such an ordained public function. 
The role of public benefit in the context of the awarded exclusive rights has 
traditionally resonated as part of the discussions on patents. Captured originally by 
Jefferson, the importance of the public benefit end has been reiterated by other 
distinguished experts.42 For instance, the Honorable William E. Simonds, 
Commissioner of Patents, reasoned that the extent of natural right exclusivity in 
intellectual property creations should be subject to limitations such as the principle 
of necessity.43 “Each original inventor of an improvement in the useful arts,” he 
outlined, “has . . . the same kind of a title to the exclusive enjoyment thereof . . . 
.”44 Commissioner Simonds further added, “[w]hile the exclusive natural right to 
an invention is a correct thing in theory, its exercise is suppressed through 
necessity.”45 Although Simonds considered patents as natural rights (unlike 
Jefferson, who posited patent rights as social rights), he nonetheless found that 
necessity could circumscribe the extent of the rights. Thus, interference into patent 
exclusivity to ensure societal benefit is viewed as a legitimate exercise serving the 
                                                          
41 See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress 
as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Clause, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1816 (2006) 
(“[The] three considerations — the fact that the Framers would not adopt the intellectual 
property proposals in the plenary form in which they were made, the political makeup of the 
Convention, and the origin of the words in the Progress Clause as qualifiers of other powers — 
all contribute to one consistent story according to which the Progress Clause was intended to 
limit Congress’s intellectual property power.”). 
42 JEFFERSON, supra note 34. 
43 See William E. Simonds, Natural Right of Property in Intellectual Production, 1 YALE L.J. 
16, 24 (1891). 
44 Id. at 24. 
45 Id. at 25. 
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objective of the system. Elsewhere Simonds outlined that “[i]n all forms of society 
all kinds of property are held under such conditions and limitations as society 
deems reasonable. Under the right of eminent domain governments take private 
property for public use on suitable remuneration when public necessity and 
convenience demanded,”46 and that “[i]t is therefore entirely reasonable that 
society should set a limit to the enjoyment of the natural right of property in 
intellectual productions.”47  
Three important points stand out from Simonds’ work that are exemplary of 
early thinking regarding the limits of rights of the inventor.48 First, early thinking 
on patent law was pervaded by concerns of its outcome – that is, the system’s 
ability to achieve its preordained objectives – rather than the rights that it created. 
Even a natural rights theorist such as Simonds considered circumscribing patent 
exclusivity to achieve the system’s objectives. Second, early developments of 
patent law seemed to repeatedly warrant interference into patent exclusivity if the 
patent system was not primarily functioning to ensure flow of benefits to society. 
Thus, it leaves a perception that early thinking revolved around the concept of 
society tolerating the grant of some rights on the inventor, as opposed to an 
inventor earning these rights. Third, the obvious view from the societal lens 
dictates adequate limitations if the end – the public benefit objective of the system 
– is not well served.  
These three points taken together demonstrate that the correlative duty is not 
a per se reward for the inventor’s genius, but a toleration by society, driven and 
dictated by the larger public benefit. An inventor can gain recognition and rights as 
a consequence of the invention, but the exclusivity aspect of the right is simply an 
intended by-product of the correlative duty that the society willingly tolerates. 
From the perspective of the law of contracts, correlative duty can be viewed as a 
consideration for the larger public benefit. Simonds’ background as the 
Commissioner of Patents perhaps defined his conception of patents as a natural 
right. Yet both Simonds and Jefferson seem to suggest that the operation of patent 
law and the exercise of exclusivity is circumscribed by the needs of society.  
                                                          
46 Id. at 23. 
47 Id. at 24. 
48 See MERGES, supra note 11, at 148 (expounding fully Locke’s theory of property and 
applying it to intellectual property rights). 
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Interestingly, Professor Balganesh makes a similar assertion in the 
background of H.L.A. Hart’s philosophy with respect to copyright law.49 Professor 
Balganesh suggests that “while the [rights and duties] always go together, the 
systematic neglect of copyright’s ‘duties’ in copyright jurisprudence and 
scholarship has over time skewed our understanding of copyright’s basic structure 
as an area of law endowed with an obligatory dimension. . . .”50 Patent law suffers 
from the same malaise. The rights package of patents necessarily embodies 
obligations imposed on patent holders, a corresponding obligation to bring forth 
public benefit. The framework of the obligations are perhaps reminiscent of the 
bipolar feature of private law highlighted by Professor Balganesh, who noted that 
the rights package vested on the inventor necessarily imposes a correlative duty on 
the society to not infringe, and a corresponding obligation on the inventor to 
generate public benefit.51 When exclusive rights are considered from the 
perspective of the self-imposed correlative duty of society to refrain from the 
property in exchange for public benefit, patent law can be accommodated into the 
edifice of private law. In turn, the inventor’s corresponding duty to society arises 
from the overlay of the law of contracts over theories of intellectual property law.52  
While patent law is not a perfect fit within the property regime, broad 
encapsulation of the limits of patent rights treads closely with the Lockean theory 
of property. Locke elaborates, “Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or 
destroy.”53 Locke conceives of property rights as entitlements to a person for 
exercising labor: 
The same law of Nature that does by this means give us property, does 
also bound that property too. . . . As much as anyone can make use of 
to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labor 
fix his property in. Whatever is beyond this is more than his share, 
and belongs to others. . . .54    
Thus, under the Lockean conception of property, the appropriation of 
property rights is only through the creator’s own sweat of the brow, and the right is 
                                                          
49 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the 
Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV 1664, 1665-66 (2012). 
50 Id. at 1666. 
51 See id. at 1667-68. 
52 See id.; Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and 
Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 844 (1998) (writing with reference to 
copyright law although the same principles can be applied to patent law).  
53 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 136 (Thomas I. ed., 1947) (1690). 
54 Id.  
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subject to the sufficiency and spoliation obligations. The sufficiency restriction 
requires that one must leave “enough and as good” for others, which Locke asserts 
is an integral part of a just property regime. The spoliation principle states that the 
creator may only appropriate as much as the creator is able to use, and may not 
claim ownership of so many natural resources that some of them spoil before he is 
able to use them.55  
Locke’s theory of sufficiency and spoliation goes further than Simonds’ 
necessity theory and provides a clearer limitation to the natural rights over 
property. In the patent context, while Locke’s theory fully recognizes the rights of 
the inventor, it also subjects the rights to the sufficiency and spoilage limitations. 
Locke’s implication is that the space for disputes over property exists because 
resources can become limited even though they may presently exist in abundance. 
That is, an inventor’s appropriation should be limited by need and not greed. Also, 
property holders must leave “enough and as good” for others. Locke repeatedly 
suggests that there is something morally wrong with distributions in which some 
people’s property leaves others with very little.56 Ironically, largess of possession 
has come to present a problem in the contemporary patent system. That is, the 
grant of patent rights cannot work to the detriment of social benefit. If it does, the 
sufficiency proviso will empower society to use the property for public benefit. 
Commenting on this, John Simmons would later say, “[t]he clear implication is 
that in later ages, when scarcity is a problem, there is room for doubt about . . . 
largeness of possession.”57  
Writing about the Lockean provisos in the context of copyright law, Wendy 
Gordon asserts, “[i]f a new creation renders the public domain less valuable, the 
proviso gives people a privilege to use the new creation to the extent necessary to 
make themselves as well off as they previously were.”58 Among other things, 
Gordon asserts that this means that major cultural developments must be open for 
                                                          
55 George H. Smith, John Locke: Some Qualifications in Locke’s Theory of Property, 
LIBERTARIANISM.ORG (Nov. 2015), available at http://www.libertarianism.org/columns/john-
locke-some-qualifications-lockes-theory-property. 
56 Daniel M. Layman, Sufficiency and Freedom in Locke’s Theory of Property, EUR. J. POL. 
THEORY (2015), available at http://ept.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/06/01/1474885 
115587118.full.pdf. 
57 JOHN A. SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 291 (1992). 
58 Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the 
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1572 (1993). 
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all to use in order to preserve the integrity of the public domain.59 In the patent 
context, life-saving drugs created using biodiversity products or drugs created 
using public funds are examples of classes of things that society should have 
access to use to the extent necessary. Gordon also concludes that the spoliation 
proviso in the copyright context prevents ownership over abstract ideas because it 
“preserves . . . public domain.”60 A similar limitation is needed in the patent 
context. Public health is a great example to serve as a bar for limiting exclusivity 
following the grant of the patent. Such limitations will also define the contours of 
the corresponding obligation of the patent owner in return for the rights gained. 
Lack of an adequate public interest exception and flexibility to enable access in the 
patent context can lead to disastrous outcomes. This is particularly the case, for 
example, in the event of a public health crisis, which can potentially be more 
disastrous in economic value than a copyright regime without a free speech 
exception. Such a reading underscores the importance of the public interest 
limitations of patent rights.61  
In the context of Lockean exceptions, it is worth pointing out that Curtis 
believes that public benefits from patents flowed through two channels: first, the 
practice of the invention during the patent term; second, the opportunity to practice 
the patent after its expiration.62 The Curtis treatise is perhaps the first to 
contextualize the importance of practicing the invention during the term. In doing 
so, Curtis seemingly connects exclusivity with the spoliation proviso in that it 
imposes a burden on the patentee to practice the invention during the patent term to 
prevent spoliation. Curtis’ work is significant in highlighting a nexus between 
exclusivity vested on the inventor and the requirement that the inventor practice 
the invention during the term. The question of whether practice of the invention by 
the inventor during the term is relevant to securing the broader public benefit goals 
                                                          
59 Id. But see JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS IN 
LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 158-63 (2002) (asserting that sufficiency is not a limitation 
especially where resources are scarce). 
60 Id. 
61 But see Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in 
Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 847 (1993) (“Being constrained by rules of 
intellectual property is a different matter from being constrained by material property rules. The 
homeless person may freeze or starve because he finds himself excluded from every sheltered 
place and prohibited from taking literally any piece of food.”). Waldron’s assertions completely 
ignore the impact of being constrained by intellectual property from accessing essential 
medication.  
62 CURTIS, supra note 35.  
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of the system has become an important issue.63 Curtis’ conception of exclusivity as 
creating at least an opportunity for the public to practice the invention is much 
broader than a mere disclosure to the public. At the very minimum, it prevents the 
patentee from hoarding the patent by not putting it into use during the patent term. 
This conception of exclusivity prevents inventors from circumventing the patent 
system by deliberately not practicing the invention and, in effect, hiding the 
invention from the public during the term of the patent.  
The above discussion on exclusivity is important to understand the 
foundations of the exclusivity doctrine. The repeated resonance of the public 
benefit objective is a common theme that informs both the historical and 
philosophical foundations of the exclusivity doctrine. It is imperative for the 
contemporary patent regimes to be engaged with the foundational objectives for 
the system. With that background, the discussion below outlines the role of patent 
disclosure to determine its role vis-à-vis patent exclusivity as well as the objectives 
of the system.  
II 
THE EMERGENCE OF A RIGHTS-CENTERED PATENT REGIME 
This part traces how, over time, the U.S. patent regime has become more 
rights-centric by focusing on the assumption that more disclosures entail more 
innovation. Such an encapsulation of the patent regime relegated the public benefit 
objective to a secondary position as a by-product instead of a mandatory 
obligation. The discussion below begins with how disclosures came to occupy a 
central position. It then highlights the various roles that courts have embraced for 
patent disclosures, which in turn has taken the focus away from the question of 
whether the system is serving its historical objective of benefitting society.  
A.  Early Signs of Disconnect 
This section examines the engagement of the exclusivity doctrine with the 
disclosure aspect of patent registration. In doing so, it traces the effect of such 
engagement as resulting in a disconnect of the exclusivity doctrine from its 
intended goals and public benefit expectations.  
Historically, it would be incorrect to categorize the U.S. patent system as 
tending towards the rights side of the balance. In Kendell v. Windsor,64 the 
                                                          
63 Id.  
64 Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 328 (1858).  
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Supreme Court noted that “[t]he limited and temporary monopoly granted to 
inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage . . . the benefit 
to the public or community at large was another and doubtless the primary object 
in granting and securing that monopoly.”65 Rather, “the true policy and ends of the 
patent laws enacted under this Government are disclosed in that article of the 
Constitution . . . ‘to promote the progress of science and the useful arts,’ 
contemplating and necessarily implying their extension, and increasing adaptation 
to the uses of society.”66 Courts were cautious not to create unwarranted private 
property. The skepticism against granting a patent was so high that there was a 
time when Justice Jackson himself lamented that “the only patent that is valid is 
one which this court has not been able to get its hands on.”67  
Yet the seeds of a rights-centric regime were laid much earlier. The 
constitutional powers of Congress notwithstanding, courts – especially the U.S. 
Supreme Court – have played an important role in shaping the doctrine.68 Two 
cases in the early 1800s arguably set the tone for correlating public acquisition at 
the end of the patent term as fulfilling the components of the exclusivity 
obligation. In Evans v. Eaton,69 the Supreme Court held that “patent law confers a 
benefit on the discoverer of any artful invention, which consists in a monopoly of 
his invention for a limited time.”70 Further, “[t]he consideration which it requires 
him to pay for this benefit, is to put the public in possession of his invention; so as 
to enable all to use it, after his monopoly shall expire.”71 The Court’s use of the 
term “consideration” alluded to the patent holder putting the public in possession 
of the invention in exchange for securing the rights. But the Court defined the 
consideration in exchange for exclusivity as the public benefitting and progressing 
from the invention after the monopoly expires, focusing on disclosure and ignoring 
other important aspects such as the public benefit from practicing the invention 
                                                          
65 Id. The House Committee reporting on the 1909 Copyright Act echoed the same sentiment: 
“[T]he enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not 
based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings, . . . but upon the ground that the 
welfare of the public will be served . . . .” H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909). 
66 Kendall, 62 U.S. at 328. 
67 Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949).   
68 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The concept of exclusivity is ingrained in the Constitution “to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Id.   
69 Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356 (1818). 
70 Id. at 413; see also MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION: A 
BIOGRAPHY 937-38 (1975).  
71 Evans, 20 U.S. at 413-14; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
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during the patent term. Similarly, in the 1829 case Pennock v. Dialogue,72 Justice 
Story opined that the crux of the patent system is to enable the public to ultimately 
acquire the innovation while recording “due regard” to the inventor in the form of 
exclusivity.73 While it is clear that the Court conceptualized the objective of a 
patent in terms of public acquisition of the invention, these cases implied that the 
public benefit aspect of exclusivity can flow after the patent term.  
Further, these cases also laid the foundation for a steady instrumental 
development of patents by positing a patent holder’s exclusive rights on a broad 
platform of the progress of science and arts.74 That is, they led to an organic 
appreciation wherein the relationship between patents and the progress requirement 
was measured by the quantity of patents, which in turn, fed into the public benefit. 
The result was a slow process that steadily divorced or distanced the inventor from 
any direct obligation to achieve the ultimate goal of public benefit. To date, the 
constituent elements of the “progress” requirements remain unresolved. Whether it 
is the disclosure, number of patents, technological advancement, public benefit, or 
a combination of one or more of these factors, remains unsettled.75 Over time, 
however, courts have come to view patent protection as a necessity for 
encouraging innovation despite economic studies to the contrary, which, in turn, 
has resulted in a view that the extent of private property rolled out is a standard 
measure of progress.76 But even assuming that the number of patents issued can 
                                                          
72 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1 (1829). 
73 Id. at 12 (“The constitution of the United States has declared, that congress shall have 
power ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times, to 
authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.’ It 
contemplates, therefore, that this exclusive right shall exist but for a limited period, and that the 
period shall be subject to the discretion of congress.”).  
74 Id.; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1980); Oliar, supra note 41, at 
1816.  
75 Simone A. Rose, The Supreme Court and Patents: Moving Toward a Postmodern Vision of 
“Progress”?, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1197, 1203 (2013). 
76 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(arguing that patent protection for genomic material, including isolated genes is crucial for 
continued innovation and economic growth of biotechnology industry). Judge Newman wrote: 
The decisions in Allappat and State Street Bank confirmed the patent eligibility of 
many evolving areas of commerce, as inventors and investors explored new 
technological capabilities. The public and the economy have experienced 
extraordinary advances in information-based and computer-managed processes, 
supported by an enlarging patent base. The PTO reports that in Class 705, the 
examination classification associated with “business methods” and most likely to 
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serve as a loose measure of technological advancement, the public benefit aspect of 
progress, or in other words, the application of the technology towards societal 
progress, remains unclear.77 That is, the patent system has been clearly posited as 
being ordained by the Constitution to promote progress, but much is needed to 
decipher the elements of progress. It cannot be mechanically equated with either 
technological advancement or number of patents issued without a clear delineation 
of public benefit goals. 
Under basic contract theories, on which patent law is partly premised, 
vesting rights sans appropriate obligations (which happens if the term “progress” is 
not viewed as a limitation) would skew the contract. Thus, the constituents of 
progress should be defined so that the mere act of invention is not associated as a 
contribution to progress, whether or not it does in fact. The currently prevailing 
and seemingly narrow view of progress is not universally accepted, and in fact fits 
uneasily with constitutional goals of countries that define economic and social 
advancement as an element of progress.78 International trade agreements also 
recognize a broader definition of progress. For example, Article 7 of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights notes that 
protecting and enforcing intellectual property rights “should contribute . . . to a 
balance of rights and obligations” of members in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare.79 Thus, benefits to the society from access, sustainability of the 
ensuing development, public health, and food security – defined more generally as 
                                                          
receive inventions that may not use machinery or transform physical matter, there 
were almost 10,000 patent applications filed in FY 2006 alone, and over 40,000 
applications filed since FY 98 when State Street Bank was decided. An amicus in 
the present case reports that over 15,000 patents classified in Class 705 have 
issued. The industries identified with information- based and data-handling 
processes, as several amici curiae explain and illustrate, include fields as diverse 
as banking and finance, insurance, data processing, industrial engineering, and 
medicine. 
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 992 (Newman, J., dissenting), aff'd but criticized sub nom. Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
77 Rose, supra note 75, at 1201.  
78 The Indian Constitution emphasizes balancing social and economic rights. See INDIA 
CONST. pmbl. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution guarantees the right to life, which includes 
the right to good health. See id. art. 21. 
79 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 7, Apr. 15, 1994 
[hereinafter TRIPS]. 
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public benefit – are all factors that form important measurements of progress.80 
Such a construction of progress serves as a limitation to the exclusive rights 
conferred in expectation of progress.81 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has 
provided little guidance on the progress limitation of the intellectual property 
clause of the Constitution.82  
Notably, in 1908, the Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to 
define a limit to patent rights vis-à-vis the public benefit objectives.83 The Supreme 
Court, in Continental Paper Bag, considered whether it could restrain the 
infringement of a patent “which has long and always and unreasonably been held 
in nonuse . . . instead of being made beneficial to the art to which it belongs.”84 The 
question presented was whether an inventor could choose not to exploit the patent 
during its term, or in other words, whether the owner of an unused patent is limited 
in law from alleging infringement.85 In dealing with this question, the Court 
emphasized that exclusivity characterized the absoluteness of the inventor’s 
property rights: “[E]xclusion vests a legal privilege on the inventor to withhold 
                                                          
80 See Rose, supra note 75, at 1198 (“A radicalized modern view of patent law allows us to 
challenge the incentive-centered narrative of promoting progress and consider this narrative’s 
impact on future discoveries, humanism, morality and the environment.”). 
81 See Oliar, supra note 41, at 1804-05 (cogently constructing how from a historical, 
interpretative and policy perspective, the term “progress” is meant to serve as a limitation of the 
Constitutional powers of the Congress in the IP clause); Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual 
Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1339 (2012); Rose, supra note 75, 
at 1201 n.11 (“Both Oliar and Fromer evaluate the structural composition of the IP Clause and 
persuasively argue that the nonbinding precedent view is incorrect since it fails to give meaning 
to the first ‘empowerment’ portion of the clause and goes against the natural textual reading or 
an ends-means relationship between providing exclusive rights (the means) to promote the end 
result of promoting progress.”). But see 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 (2004) (treating the “progress” portion of the IP clause as a 
preamble term introducing Congress’s broad powers in implementing Patent and Copyright 
protection).  
82 See Malla Pollock, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote? Defining “Progress” in Article 
I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 
NEB. L. REV. 754, 767 (2001); Rose, supra note 75, at 1203 (clarifying that progress in the paper 
references a general sense and not progress in the copyright sense).  
83 See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 250 (1897) (“The inventor is one who 
has discovered something of value. It is his absolute property. He may withhold the knowledge 
of it from the public, and he may insist upon all the advantages and benefits which the statute 
promises to him who discloses to the public his invention.”). 
84 Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co. (Continental Paper Bag), 210 U.S. 405, 422 
(1908).  
85 Id.  
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knowledge from the public while insisting on deriving the advantages and benefits 
the statute promises.”86 Unused patents deprive the public of the patent’s benefits 
during the term and thus prejudicially impact the public interest.87 The Court 
refused to acknowledge the effects of nonuse on competition or on public rights.88 
Instead, the Court noted, “[i]t is the privilege of any owner of property to use or 
not use it, without question of motive.”89 As a result, the Court filtered out 
“working the invention during the term” from the public benefit aspect, thereby 
leaving “disclosure” as the sole residue that constitutes the public benefit output. In 
doing so, Continental Paper Bag marked a watershed moment, showcasing a shift 
towards treatment of patents as absolute property instead of a governmental grant 
which entails responsibilities towards the public.  
After Continental Paper Bag, judicial opinions supporting limitations on 
exclusivity have remained as minority opinions.90 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
expressly reconsidered Continental Paper Bag in eBay v. MercExchange,91 but 
unfortunately refused to reject or adopt a different approach, such as requiring the 
use or practice of the patented material during the term.92 The decision found that 
                                                          
86 Id. at 424; see also Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. at 249. 
87 See id.  
88 Continental Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 425 (internal quotation marks omitted) (responding to 
the petitioner’s assertion regarding the effect on competitors, the Court added that “whenever 
this court has had occasion to speak, it has decided that an inventor receives from a patent the 
right to exclude others from its use for the time prescribed in the statute. And, for his exclusive 
enjoyment of it during that time, the public faith is pledged”).  
89 Id. at 429.  
90 Restricting exclusivity has remained the minority position in the United States. For 
example, the dissent of District Judge Aldrich in the First Circuit, from where Continental Paper 
Bag was appealed, favored restricting patent rights on the grounds that nonuse of patents for 
private benefits discouraged inventive activity. See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 
150 F. 741 (1st Cir. 1906). Judge Aldrich stated that patents were meant to encourage invention 
by protecting the right to make, use and vend the product in public interest. Hence, he opined 
that the court should discourage activities hindering that objective by preventing the patent 
owner from alleging infringement. Judge Aldrich felt that the patent owner’s nonuse was for 
unconscionable private pecuniary gain. In not restricting the patent owner’s right, Judge Aldrich 
felt that the court of equity helped the owner to accomplish nonuse for private gains and thus 
contravened the spirit of equity and public policy. Id. at 745, 757. Justice Douglas recaptured the 
substance of Judge Aldrich’s opinion, albeit in his dissent, in Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 
370 (1945). Justice Douglas argued that courts should interfere where patent owners misuse 
patents since patents are conditioned on public purposes per U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8. See 
Special Equip., 324 U.S. at 384; see also Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 150 F. at 744-45, 757. 
91 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
92 See id. at 393. 
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infringement remedies should be subject to the traditional four-factor test based on 
equitable considerations to determine whether an injunction should issue in favor 
of a patent owner against an alleged infringer.93 However, the Supreme Court did 
not go further to treat nonuse of the patent by the owner as a ground to deny 
injunctive relief or be a central part of the four-factor test.94 Of particular interest is 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which specifically identifies that “[a]n industry has 
developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods 
but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”95 While Justice Kennedy 
strongly advocates against automatically affirming a patentee’s absolute right to 
exclude through injunctions in cases of non-practicing patentees, the concurrence 
urges courts to grant damages of reasonable royalties.96 The guidance from the 
Supreme Court has resulted in courts increasingly approving reasonable royalties 
and vacating permanent injunctions.97 Yet Continental Paper Bag stands in 
contrast to the wisdom of the Curtis treatise.98 The case serves as an early exemplar 
of how courts have failed to construe practice of inventions during the patent term 
as part of the inventor’s obligation to contribute to the public benefit paradigm in 
return for exclusivity.99 Unfortunately, courts have not ventured to determine 
whether a patentee’s rights entail an obligation, in public interest, to practice the 
                                                          
     93 Id. 
     94 Id. 
     95 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 395-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
     96 Id.  
97 See, e.g., Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(approving a reasonable royalty award and vacating an injunction); See Neil Tyler, Patent 
nonuse and technology suppression: The use of compulsory licensing to promote progress,  162 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 451, 467 ( 2013); See also Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of 
Nonpracticing Patentees After eBay v. MercExchange, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 31 (2009) 
(“These courts have decided, though not always expressly, that a nonpracticing patentee is 
entitled only to the royalty it would have earned had the parties executed a license . . . .”). 
98 CURTIS, supra note 35. 
99 See, for example, SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981) where Xerox 
was sued for refusing to use or license its patents involving its paper copier technology. The 
court asserted that this was a lawful exercise of its patent rights. See also PETER MEINHARDT, 
INVENTIONS, PATENTS AND MONOPOLY 189 (1946) (“Probably 80 to 90 percent of all patented 
inventions are not worked in practice.”). See also Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role 
of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 394 
(2002) (discussing the anticompetitive effects of patent nonuse); see also SRIVIDHYA RAGAVAN, 
PATENT AND TRADE DISPARITIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (2012) 
(highlighting how internationally, jurisdictions like India did emphasize the practice through 
working requirements and how the TRIPS Agreement has forced such requirements to be 
amended on the grounds that it affects international trade). 
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patent during the term. Emphasis on practicing the patent during its term could 
have prevented some of the woes from Continental Paper Bag, as outlined below.  
B.  Woes of Continental Paper Bag 
Continental Paper Bag set the tone for the manifestation of several woes 
from not obligating the practice of patents during the term. First, Continental 
Paper Bag has served as an important background to establish the absoluteness of 
the exclusive rights during the patent term and thus ignore public interest-based 
responsibilities of patentees to practice during the term of the patent.100 Over time, 
patent owners have capitalized on patents by not practicing the invention during 
the term and reaping the benefits by asserting the patent strategically against (often 
unassuming) practicing entities.101 Patent owners keep the patent from the public 
until it can be successfully asserted against a practicing entity. The perversity of 
the problem is best understood through the reality that a new business model has 
developed where patent owners benefit from hoarding instead of using the 
patent.102 This behavior has led to ‘trolling,’ which is defined as the act of using the 
patent merely as an assertion tool (to assert against infringers) and not as a tool for 
furthering innovation.103 That a considerable number of patent holders choose to 
find hoarding more rewarding than commercializing the patent during the 
monopoly term is telling of the woes that have affected the system from not 
associating practice of the invention during the term with the larger goals of the 
system.  
Second, failing to associate the use of the patent with the resulting public 
interest goals has strengthened the association of disclosure with the ultimate goals 
of the system.104 Slowly, the status of disclosure has been elevated as the main quid 
                                                          
100 Continental Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 424.  
101 See, e.g., F.T.C., TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY 38-39 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
102 See, e.g., MercExchange, 547 U.S. at 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“An 
industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for production and selling 
goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”). 
103 See Saunders, supra note 99 (discussing the anticompetitive effects of patent nonuse). 
104 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1028 (1989) (“The incentive to disclose argument, 
which has been more popular with the courts than with commentators, rests on the premise that 
in the absence of patent protection inventors would keep their inventions secret in order to 
prevent competitors from exploiting them.”); see also Fritz Machlup, Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., An Economic Review 
of the Patent System, 32-33 (1958) (discussing four theses that are offered for patent protection: 
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pro quo of the inventor’s monopoly.105 Although the constitutional goal of 
“promoting the progress of useful arts” was never formally relegated to a 
secondary position,106 the return for securing the bundle of rights was gradually 
narrowed to the element of public disclosure.107 Even the Supreme Court 
effectively treated public disclosure as the only consideration in exchange for 
granting patent rights. Indeed, in 1933, the Supreme Court elaborated, “in 
consideration of [an invention’s] disclosure and the consequent benefit to the 
community, the patent [wa]s granted.”108 This proposition later found its way into 
Bonito Boats,109 the 1989 decision which laid the groundwork for the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) to embrace the exact 
proposition.110 Thus, disclosure came to be the only element needed to fulfill the 
progress requirement.111 As the disclosure doctrine slowly became identified with 
the consequential public benefit and the progress of useful arts requirement, it was 
a natural shift to justify patentees’ rights as a return for the disclosure made.   
                                                          
(i) the “natural-law” thesis; (ii) the “reward-by-monopoly” thesis; (iii) the “monopoly-profit-
incentive” thesis; and (iv) the “exchange-for-secrets” thesis, and further elaborating on the last 
thesis that it works on the premise that in the absence of patent protection inventors would keep 
their inventions secret in order to prevent competitors from exploiting them); WILLIAM D. 
NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 89 (1969). 
105 See, e.g., Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Come, 8 J. INTL. L. BUS. 666, 668-70 (1998). That is, the inventor reveals the 
invention in return for the government’s promise of a specified statutory monopoly on the 
production of the idea. Id. at 681; see also The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2006); Jondora 
Music Publ’g Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572, 577 (D.N.J. 1972). 
106 See Timothy Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the 
United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2004) (asserting 
that the language in Article 1, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution “to promote the Progress of the 
Useful Arts” is the mandate to promote patents, and that the reference to “science” relates to the 
Copyright Act). 
107 Ewin, supra note 37, at 481.   
108 U.S. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 amended by U.S. v. Dubilier 
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 706 (1933). 
109 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989).  
110 See Roin, supra note 16, at 2011-12 (“The Federal Circuit, which hears the bulk of patent 
infringement suits, frequently uses the same rhetoric, describing disclosure as the ‘linchpin’ and 
‘quid pro quo’ of the patent system.”); see also W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 
1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
111 See Roin, supra note 16. 
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C.  The Rights-Centric Regime 
The above narrative highlighted how the disclosure requirement gained a 
central position in defining the objectives of the patent system. The narrative below 
describes how the disclosure requirement has been used to further expand the 
scope of patent rights. The disclosure requirement has resulted in more patents 
without necessarily resulting in a corresponding increase in innovation.  
First, materials not disclosed in a specific manner were treated as being 
unknown to the public, and thus susceptible to creating private rights. The 
teaching, suggestion, and motivation (TSM) test serves as an example of this 
proposition. The TSM test was first applied in the 1960s by the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals (the Federal Circuit’s predecessor) to determine the burden of 
proof for nonobviousness during patent prosecution.112 In ACS Hospital Systems,113 
the Federal Circuit first enunciated that teachings of prior art references could be 
combined to prove obviousness only if there was a specific teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation in the prior art to do so.114 By 1985, the Federal Circuit elevated this 
rule into a standardized prescription from which examiners could not derogate.115 
Consequently, examiners were prohibited from rejecting patent applications for 
obviousness unless they had “elucidate[d] . . . factual teachings, suggestions or 
incentives from th[e] prior art that show[] . . . the propriety of [the patented] . . . 
combination.”116 In other words, under the TSM test, the examiner bears the initial 
prima facie burden to show clear teaching, suggestion, or motivation from the prior 
art such that it would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the 
references to arrive at the claimed invention. Thus, a claimed application will be 
                                                          
112 See Application of Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048 (C.C.P.A. 1976); Application of Regel, 526 
F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1975); Application of Avery, 518 F.2d 1228 (C.C.P.A. 1975); Application 
of Imperato, 486 F.2d 585 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Application of Andre, 52 C.C.P.A. 1019 (1965). 
113 ACS Hosp. Sys, Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp. (ACS Hospital Systems), 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 
(Fed. Cir. 1984); see also ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 664 (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter MERGES & DUFFY]. 
114 See ACS Hospital Systems, 732 F.2d at 1577. 
115 MERGES & DUFFY, infra note 120; see also Ashland Oil v. Delta Resins & Refractories, 
776 F.2d 281, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
116
 Id.; see also In re Kemps, 97 F.3d 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the Patent and 
Trademark Office’s factual determinations on the issue of obviousness, regarding which 
references teach and whether a reference teaches toward or away from claimed invention, are 
binding on the Court of Appeals, which employed the clearly erroneous standard). But see In re 
Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reversing the above decision and noting that the PTO 
Board’s decision will be subject to substantial evidence standard under the Administrative 
Procedure Act).  
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considered prima facie nonobvious unless there is a showing of specific teaching, 
suggestion or motivation from the prior art to make the combination.117    
The TSM test in effect lowered the threshold of prima facie obviousness 
during prosecution by creating a standardized prescription to determine an 
objective element. The TSM test was touted as a means to minimize examiners’ 
subjectivity and reduce rejections of patent applications based on hindsight bias.118 
But it eliminated a critical element – the application of common sense of an 
examiner – from the obviousness determination.119 Thus, the TSM standard created 
a unique form of legal obviousness by disengaging the examiner’s use of common 
sense.120 The end result was application materials otherwise obvious to a person of 
ordinary skill in the art which were able to clear the legal nonobvious threshold.121 
This greatly facilitated stacking more private rights to the detriment of the public 
domain. In Re Dembiczak stands as an outstanding demonstration of the above 
point.122 There, the Federal Circuit held that a Halloween-themed trash bag was a 
patentable invention because there was no prior art showing a “clear and 
particular” teaching to use all of the claim limitations, namely, the use of a plastic 
bag in pre-manufactured orange color and with specific Halloween facial indicia.123 
In re Dembiczak was by no means an aberration, but instead formed part of a 
steady stream of cases where the line between obvious and nonobvious was 
determined by what was typecast in the prior art, as opposed to what existed in the 
public domain.124 While the TSM test may have taken credit for reducing rejections 
based on hindsight bias, it clearly led to an over-allowance of patent applications. 
                                                          
117 See Application of Rinehart, 531 F.2d at 1052 (standing for the proposition that the burden 
shifts onto the patentee to prove nonobviousness of the claimed invention by putting forward 
objective evidence). 
118 Obviousness is an objective test conducted from the vantage point of a person of skill in 
the art. See 35 U.S.C. §103 (2012).  
119 Feroz Ali Khader & Srividhya Ragavan, Proof of Progress: The Role of Obviousness 
Standard in the Indian Patent Office, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT LAW 571 (2014). 
120 Srividhya Ragavan & Feroz Khader, The Selection Of Patents: Regulatory Reforms versus 
Market Reliance To Weed Out Suspect Patents, 46(1) INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION 
L. 38, 44 (2015). 
121 Id. at 44-45. 
122 See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999) abrogated by In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 
1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000).   
123 See id. at 1000. 
124 See Khader & Ragavan, supra note 119, at 596; see also Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. 
Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 
1361, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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As for disclosures, in excluding specifically undisclosed materials from the 
definition of prior art, even if the material was otherwise obvious, the TSM test 
resulted in further elevating the role and importance of disclosures. The test stood 
on the assumption that submitted prior arts should be embodiments of every 
possible teaching and combination applicable to an invention. Consequently, 
materials not explicitly taught, suggested, or motivated by the prior art were 
susceptible to a prima facie clearance as being nonobvious.125 The result was more 
patents, some of which embodied minor innovations, leading to more private rights 
to the detriment of the public domain and the progress requirement.126  
  The rigid application of the TSM test resulted in a marked difficulty “to 
invalidate bad patents, and thereby stifling innovation.”127 The costs to society 
from the monopolies awarded by patents embodying a lower obviousness threshold 
became unjustified.128 The result was a perverse trend in the United States, where 
about fifty-five percent of patents were not renewed at the eight-year period after 
their issuance.129 The TSM test was largely diluted after the Supreme Court 
intervened in KSR v. Teleflex and reestablished a common sense based approach 
similar to the statutory test in 35 U.S.C. § 103 to determine nonobviousness.130 
                                                          
125 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 171 (2006) 
(asserting that the TSM test treats the nonobviousness requirement akin to the novelty test). 
Holbrook suggests that it is akin to having one reference “incorporating by reference” all of the 
other prior arts. Id.  
126 Id.  
127 Stephen G. Kunin & Andrew K. Beverina, KSR’s Effect on Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
50, 50-51 (2007).  
128 See Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner 
at 9-11, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350); Brief of Amici 
Curiae Cisco Systems Inc. et al. in Support of Reversal for Petitioner at 2-3, KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350) (arguing that the suggestion test’s low bar to 
patentability made patents of technologically trivial subject matter possible); Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 
398 (2007) (No. 04-1350) (“[The suggestion test] exacts a heavy cost in the form of unwarranted 
extension of patent protection to obvious subject matter.”); see also Randall J. Hirsch, Well Duh: 
Obviousness, Gas Pedals, and the Teaching-Suggestion-Motivation Test, 6 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 89, 90 (2007) (asserting that the general criticism of the TSM test was that it set 
the threshold too low for patentability, allowing for the issuance of obvious patents, which 
contravenes public policy). 
129 William H. Brown, Trends in Patent Renewal at the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office, 17 WORLD PAT. INFO. 225, 227 (1995) (noting that in 1994, statistics indicated that only 
about fifty-five percent of patents are renewed at the end of the eight-year period).  
130 KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 415-22. After KSR, the USPTO issued new examination 
guidelines outlining several bases for rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103, one of which was the 
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However, the historical development of the TSM test exemplifies how disclosures 
were elevated to a point where common sense had a limited role.   
Biotechnology patents represent an area where the disclosure requirement 
has been extensively used to define the rights and limits of patenting.131 For 
instance, a gradual lowering of standards in biotechnology inventions in the 
1990s,132 such as in In Re Deuel,133 largely lowered the threshold for biotechnology 
patent applications, resulting in an increase in biotechnology patent activity.134 
                                                          
TSM test; see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 2143 (U.S.P.T.O. 2008); see also 
Tom Irving, Lauren L. Stevens & Scott M. K. Lee, Nonobviousness in the U.S. Post-KSR for 
Innovative Drug Companies, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 157, 159 (2009). 
131 See Amy Maxmen, The Great Gene-Patent Debate: How the Myriad Genetics 
Gene-Patent Case Might Affect Personalized Medicine, NATURE (July 20, 2012), 
http://www.nature.com/news/the-great-gene-patent-debate-1.11044; Julia Carbone et al., DNA 
Patents and Diagnostics: Not a Pretty Picture, 28 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 784 (2010); see 
also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc. (Mayo), 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 (2012) 
(“The laws of nature at issue here are narrow laws that may have limited applications, but the 
patent claims that embody them nonetheless implicate this concern . . . [a]nd they threaten to 
inhibit the development of more refined treatment recommendations . . .”). See generally Ariad 
Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1371-77 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari at 17, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (Myriad), 133 S. Ct. 
2107 (2013) (No. 11-72517); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 
124, 127 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The problem arises from the fact that patents do not 
only encourage research by providing monetary incentives for invention. Sometimes their 
presence can discourage research by impeding the free exchange of information, for example by 
forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by leading them to conduct 
costly and time-consuming searches of existing or pending patents, by requiring complex 
licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs of using the patented information, sometimes 
prohibitively so.”).  
132 See, e.g., Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Amgen was a 
decision rendered under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), and thus not a question of obviousness. The case 
enabled the patentability of an adequately conceived DNA sequence. The Federal Circuit held 
that DNA sequences adequately defined in a manner sufficiently disclosing its actual structure 
and method of preparation would be considered as having been reduced to practice, even though 
an inventor may be unaware of its actual structure and nowhere near disclosing the actual 
structure. Id. at 1211; see also U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008. 
133 In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that obvious to try is not 
obvious); see also RAGAVAN, supra note 99, at 211-12.  
134 Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Nonobviousness Standard for Gene Patents: Protecting 
Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 143 (2000). 
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This resulted in a proliferation of intellectual property rights in biomedical 
research.135 As one court noted,  
[B]etween 1990 and 1998, the total number of biotechnology patents 
granted to U.S. corporations has quadrupled. In contrast, between 
1990 and 1998, the total number of patents issued increased by about 
sixty percent. This large disparity is cause for concern. It suggests that 
the biotechnology industry is using the relaxed nonobviousness 
standard to obtain genomic patents simply for corporate gain.136  
The increase in patent activity was attributed to a regime that adequately 
lowered thresholds, resulting in patenting of basic biotechnology research 
materials. It placed the biotechnology industry in a “spiral of overlapping patent 
claims in the hands of different owners.”137 The result was that some basic research 
materials became inaccessible owing to the private property status which also 
increased the access cost effectively slowing down the pace of innovation in this 
area.138 While these realities mandated that the free-for-all in biotechnology patent 
applications be capped, they also highlighted that the system greatly facilitated 
accumulating patent rights.139 The Federal Circuit attempted to fix such a rights-
centric patent regime by expanding the doctrine of written description, a traditional 
disclosure doctrine, to include enabling functions, thereby further contributing to 
the elevation of disclosure.140 In Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit held that a functional 
definition of a gene would be insufficient to meet the written description 
requirement because it merely indicates what the gene does, rather than what it 
                                                          
135 See Anita Varma & David Abraham, DNA Is Different: Legal Obviousness and the 
Balance Between Biotech Inventors and the Market, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 53, 78 (1996) (“On 
the one hand, based on prior art knowledge, the biotechnologist knows that sequencing around 
twenty amino acids is sufficient to obtain the cDNA sequence that codes for a particular 
protein, absent unforeseen difficulties. On the other hand, under current law, the expected 
product of this scientifically obvious manipulation is legally unobvious and thus patentable.”).  
136 Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 134, at 165. 
137 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. MAG. 698 (1998). 
138 Id. 
139 Cf. Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 134, at 165.  
140 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997); 
Shraddha A. Upadhaya, The Postmodern Written Description Requirement: An Analysis of the 
Application of the Heightened Written Description Requirement to Original Claims, 4 MINN. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 65, 109-10 (2002). 
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is.141 The Federal Circuit further held that a “meaningful disclosure” was the 
exchange for patent exclusivity and where the disclosure was inadequate, the 
material was susceptible to being denied protection.142 From Eli Lilly in 1997 
through the Ariad decision in 2010,143 the Federal Circuit largely relied on 
enabling disclosures in the written description of biotechnology specifications as a 
correctional mechanism.144  
The above narrative highlights how disclosures have steadily grown to 
occupy a central role in defining the rights and limits of patenting, obviating the 
need for broader discussions on public benefit and the constituents of the progress 
requirement.   
III 
RECOGNIZING RESPONSIBILITIES: CORRELATIVE OBLIGATION OF PATENTS 
This part examines whether the normative framework imposes any 
obligation on the inventor by examining the relationship between patent rights and 
the theoretical bases of the societal duty not to infringe. In doing so, the narrative 
focuses on fundamental values and returns that characterize the notions of 
patenting. First, this part traces the philosophical underpinnings of the patent rights 
framework. Second, it examines the philosophical justifications for these rights to 
understand the framework for establishing the obligations of the right holder. 
Lastly, this part focuses on how the duty practically operates and directs the law to 
create fundamental values and returns (privilege duty) that characterize the notions 
of patenting.145  
                                                          
141 Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568; see also Lisa A. Karczewski, Comment, Biotechnological Gene 
Patent Applications: The Implications of the USPTO Written Description Requirement 
Guidelines on the Biotechnology Industry, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1043, 1078 (2000) (arguing 
that the court’s holding that a generic description of the genus such as “vertebrate insulin cDNA” 
or “mammalian insulin cDNA” distinguishes the claimed genus only by function and hence is an 
inadequate written description). 
142 See Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 970; see also Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 
F.3d 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 970). 
143 Ariad Pharmaceuticals et al. v. Eli Lilly and Company (Ariad), 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
144 Id. at 1358 (finding the Ariad patent invalid on the grounds that the patent failed to 
adequately describe the invention and thus, to enable the specification).  
145 DRAHOS, supra note 15, at 220-23. 
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A.  Rights Framework 
Western discourse on intellectual property law conceptualizes patents as 
incentivizing the inventor and gathering the benefits of the exercise through public 
disclosure.146 Exploring patents from the perspective of the relationship between 
the rights and obligations is essential to appreciate the existing structure of the 
rights-obligations balance. The desire to innovate, fuel creative genius, and 
promote the progress of useful arts are all explanations that support the rights 
paradigm of the patent system.147 These explanations, however, do not fully define 
the societal obligation imposed on third parties to refrain from infringing patents. 
The narrative below examines the philosophical underpinnings that can perhaps 
justify the correlative obligation construct and its relationship with the vested 
rights of the patent holder.  
Bentham categorizes rights into two distinct typologies based on their 
relationships with legal obligation.148 Bentham’s first category encompasses rights 
resulting from the absence of legal obligations.149 Here, the law may actively 
permit or passively not prohibit certain actions, leaving the right holder with the 
liberty to decide whether or not to exercise the right.150 Bentham’s second category 
addresses rights existing as a by-product of obligations imposed by law on 
others.151 Patent exclusivity falls into this second category because it exists as a by-
product of a statutorily imposed societal obligation not to infringe the patent. The 
legal obligation under the second category embodies a principal law “requiring the 
act which is obligatory” and a subsidiary law “requiring or permitting punishment 
for breach” of that obligation.152 The failure to conduct oneself in a specified 
manner as required under a principal law should result in pain (or its equivalent, 
loss of pleasure), which is legally imposed by a subsidiary law as a punitive 
measure for non-compliance with the principal law.153 H.L.A Hart refers to this as 
inherently embodying both imperative and probabilistic elements.154 It is 
imperative in that sanctions are mandated by the subsidiary law and probabilistic in 
                                                          
146 See, e.g., MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 191 
(Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 6th ed. 2012). 
147 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
148 H.L.A HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 165 (1982) [hereinafter ESSAYS ON BENTHAM]. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 166.  
151 Id. at 165. 
152 Id. at 134. 
153 Id. at 131-32. 
154 Id. at 132-34. 
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that there is a probability of incurring sanctions if obligations are not fulfilled. 
Bentham terms this second category of rights as “services,” typified by a 
“correlative obligation,” which are requirements of action or forbearance imposed 
on third parties.155 That is, a right is an “enforced service” that results when the law 
creates a correlative obligation that imposes a duty of forbearance on society in 
favor of the right holder.156 A patent right is an “enforced service” wherein 
infringement of patents (even if by independent creation) represents an imposed 
legal obligation.157 The correlative obligation of the society is a service right that 
provides the inventor the ability to benefit from a duty of forbearance imposed on 
the rest of the society.158 In other words, having a right correlative conferred by 
law onto the right holder relative to an obligation denotes that it leads to a 
benefit.159  
The benefits to the right holder under these circumstances tend to be 
indirect.160 The right holder may, but does not have to, benefit directly from the 
performance of the legal obligation by others. Compliance by third parties with the 
legal obligation to refrain from infringing patented materials makes it conducive 
for the patent owner to benefit indirectly. Forbearance from the patented material 
by third parties prevents a potential loss.161 Hence, the benefits that patent 
exclusivity confers on the patent holder are indirect, negative in nature, and 
dependent upon the compliance of third parties with their legal obligations. 
Bentham defines them as contingently beneficial laws and notes that the duties 
under such laws are relative to the right holder, who wields complete control over 
the area covered by the duty. A right holder may, for instance, decide to prosecute 
one individual with a duty of forbearance while deciding to waive his rights with 
regard to a similar transgression by another individual. The concept of the relative 
duty of the right holder contrasts with the more absolute nature of such duties 
under criminal law, where certain actions are prohibited against all individuals by 
enforcement of law.162 Thus, under a contingently beneficial law, the correlative 
duties of third parties are akin to “species of normative property belonging to the 
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right holder.”163 They are property that derives from norms that belong to identified 
individuals, under which the right holder is empowered by the legal provisions to 
enjoy a special control.164 Termed as the power of “contrectation,” the right 
holder’s power is a legal permission to an act which, if done by any other, would 
result in the contravention of the law.165  
The benefits flowing to the right holder from contingently beneficial laws 
invariably remain dependent on a plethora of causes and effects. For example, the 
patent application process has carefully tailored disclosure requirements to 
facilitate future replication.166 Statutory requirements such as written description 
and enablement serve to ensure that even if the inventor perishes, the invention 
remains available to the public.167 Thus, an inventor whose patent application falls 
short of statutory requirements like disclosure may see the flow of benefits 
discontinued under certain conditions. Similarly, a refusal to disclose the invention 
will lead to a refusal of the bundle of rights that forms the patent package. Thus, 
arguably disclosure is just one example of the expectation the general public 
receives in return for the correlative obligation not to infringe.168 In return for the 
sufferance of the imposed correlative obligation, Bentham notes that the public as 
“unassignable individuals” acquire broad returns such as that from the 
disclosure.169 
B.  Justifications for the Rights 
Having discussed the nature of rights, this section examines the reason for 
conferring such rights and possible reasons for the societal tolerance of the 
correlative obligation. Thus, this section examines each of the justifications for the 
correlative obligation, including the law of contracts.  
The first of these reasons is perhaps a sense of generosity which provides a 
simple enough explanation. Unfortunately, it is unlikely to be the reason for the 
legal obligations tailored to benefit the right holder. If mankind uniformly had such 
a strong sense of generosity, or any other public interest based reason to promote 
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innovation without any expectation to itself, arguably there would be no need for 
rules.170 David Hume, in The Book of Morals, asserts, “Men being naturally selfish, 
or endow[e]d only with a confin[e]d generosity, they are not easily induc[e]d to 
perform any action for the interest of strangers, except with a view to some 
reciprocal advantage, which they had no hope of obtaining but by such a 
performance.”171 Hume adds that “[it is] only from the selfishness and confin[e]d 
generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, 
that justice derives its origin.”172 Thus, the question of the benefit to society from 
treating patented property as privileged, thereby forbearing from the property 
during the term.  
A different construct examining the basis of correlative duty is a sense of 
individual morality.173 That is, does a sense of moral obligation to not take away 
from the inventor what he created provide adequate justification for the society’s 
tolerance of the correlative obligation? The interaction between law and morality is 
a romanticized aspect of our legal system. Like justice, morality remains elusive, 
and hence, provides easy explanations to appreciate normative structures. Thus, 
one can justify that moral obligation formed the basis of the legal obligation that 
imposes the correlative duty on the society. Yet, a positivist like Hart would assert 
that there is no necessary connection between law and morality.174 Even assuming 
there is a connection between law and morality, morals that vest the correlative 
obligation on the inventor should also obligate the patent holder to certain duties in 
return for legal rights.  
A further expansion of the concept of morality – religious morality – also 
fails to fully account for the self-imposed correlative duty of the society.175 
Religious morality asserts that God ordained labor as a fundamental right of 
men.176 This reasoning posits that the creation of monopoly is consistent with the 
right to labor except that the king or lawmaker with powers to effectuate a 
monopoly also has a duty to ensure that it is duly limited.177 This position is 
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reflected in the Statute of Monopolies, which notes that monopolies were tolerated 
only when they resulted in public good.178  
Yet another justification for the patent system is that it meant to vest a 
privilege so as to promote the growth of “human capital” – that is, to encourage the 
transfer of valuable trade and technologies.179 It is well documented that in 
thirteenth-century England, the Crown’s prerogative in granting a monopoly was to 
generate more trade or technology and diffuse them into the society.180 Professor 
Drahos, in tracing the historical and philosophical underpinnings of intellectual 
property rights including patents, supports the view that patent rights were 
considered a strong form of interference with negative liberties, or the right of 
others to pursue certain trade.181 This view supports the proposition that the 
inventor had an obligation to the society and is well supported by the law of 
contracts.  
The law of contracts, by imposing a reciprocal corresponding obligation on 
the patent holder, can provide a better justification for the correlative obligation in 
the context of patent rights. As such, in a bilateral contract, one party’s obligation 
is correlative and reciprocal to the obligation of the other. A patent, as a 
government grant, repositions society as third-party beneficiaries. Imposing a duty 
(corresponding obligation) in exchange for the society’s correlative obligation 
would be a functional aspect of the grant. That is, the society has a correlative duty 
not to infringe the patent in return for which the patent owner has a corresponding 
duty to the society which includes, but is not limited to, the disclosure. Hence, the 
inventor, in exchange for the grant, may be charged with obligations benefitting 
the society. Under these circumstances, the third party, presumably the public in 
the context of a patent, while being the direct beneficiary lacks the legal right to 
enforce the contract should a breach detrimentally affect him. The right correlative 
to the obligation, under these circumstances, is held by the party having the control 
over the correlative obligation. In effect, the society will have the correlative 
obligation not to infringe the patent, the government will have control over the 
obligation, and in exchange, the patent holder will be subject to the corresponding 
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obligation to secure public benefit objectives. This view justifies governmental 
interferences in the form of, say, a compulsory license, when there is a problem 
affecting the flow of benefit to the society.  
The contract-oriented view finds support in writings of H.L.A Hart, who, in 
alluding to Bentham’s conception of the law of contracts, differentiates the 
imposition of duty under the law of contract as being “‘incomplete’ in a more 
radical way than the law underlying the institution of property.”182 Part of the 
reason for the incomplete status is that under the law of contracts, acts that fall 
within the determination of the duty paradigm are left undefined. Hart suggests that 
“this open area may be restricted in a greater or lesser degree by the law’s insertion 
of compulsory clauses into contracts, or by its refusal to recognize the validity of 
certain types of agreement.”183 Thus, general law can provide for certain 
compulsory restrictions on rights under certain circumstances, or government as 
the grantor and the control holder can insert regulations of varying degrees, which 
is not new to modern intellectual property systems. Using contracts as a 
mechanism would bind the inventor to a corresponding obligation in return for the 
rights. Thus, the inventor would be subject to the exercise of the power of 
imperation – that is, the power to ensure that individuals act in conformity with a 
command.184 Imperative theory has its basis on the power of legislative and 
administrative bodies to create rules and regulations that result in increased 
effectiveness or efficiencies. Extending the analogy to patents, imperative theory 
would conceive of patents as providing exclusive rights granted under a contract 
wherein the rights may be limited to achieve the public benefit goals of the system. 
Under the patent regime, access to the invention for the public typically 
begins when the patent term is over. But the correlative duty of forbearance from 
the property, termed as “enforced service,” begins immediately after the rights are 
acquired.185 Considering this, treating disclosures as the unique goal in exchange 
for patent rights does not account for the imposed correlative obligation during the 
patent term. Further, if societal access to the invention through disclosures were 
the only goal, they can be effectively generated using other mechanisms, such as a 
one-time prize, which can also ensure faster societal access to the innovation.  
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C.  Patent Law from the Rights & Duties Framework 
This section provides a framework for rights and duties in the context of 
patent exclusivity to appreciate the public benefit objectives of the patent system. 
The bundle of rights awarded with the grant of a patent can be condensed into 
offshoots of the negative exclusionary rights. That is, the patent holder’s right is 
limited to excluding others from commercially exploiting the invention without a 
license. These negative rights contrast with the affirmative rights for a property 
owner to use and enjoy her property. The affirmative right to use one’s property 
gives rise to the property owner’s right to exclude others,186 as exclusion is 
important to the owner’s use and enjoyment of the property.187 The patent regime’s 
focus on negative rights is different from the real property regime, but is closer to 
the contractual grant. Unlike real property, patents are nonrivalrous, and thus one 
does not need an exclusive right as a functional necessity to practice the invention 
in the same way that a property owner needs an exclusive right to enjoy her 
property. That is, the inventor can continue to use and practice the invention even 
without the exclusive rights. Exclusivity does not vest any additional rights to use 
the patented invention. Hence, it becomes important to appreciate the role and 
characteristics of exclusivity in patents in order to appreciate the objectives for 
granting it.  
Unlike in property law, where property rights are granted for facilitating 
possession of property, the rights of the patent owner are not awarded to facilitate 
possession of the invention. Patent rights are subject to traversing certain minimum 
thresholds of inventiveness, and are acquired after careful examination by the 
patent office. Possession can be inconsequential to patent law. Further, not all 
innovations and new ideas are granted patents. A novel invention can still fail to 
acquire the associated bundle of rights by being subject to a statutory bar,188 lack of 
inventive genius, or other grounds for invalidity. Unlike in real property, where 
interference with ownership alone is sufficient to establish trespass, in patent law, 
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the determination of infringement requires proof of both ownership and validity. 
This sets patents apart from other forms of property.  
Theoretically, every form of property (which includes the physical and the 
technological) would have a value (base worth) assuming there is free competition 
and no protection. Such base worth is the value of the property or the product 
covering the physical property and the technology, but without the privilege of 
exclusivity. The factum of exclusivity (or, relatedly, fencing of the property) can 
operate to impose an artificially higher market value on account of the artificial 
scarcity, but the minimum value or base worth should remain the same 
notwithstanding the presence of exclusivity. There is truly no reason to suspect that 
falling into the public domain would alter the property value, at least until there are 
substitutes in the market. In reality, unfenced land per se can be equally valuable 
as fenced land in the market, as is true with inventive ideas. And an inventor who 
lets the invention into the public domain should be able to generate a minimum 
value equivalent to the base worth, at least until the invention is replicated or 
recreated.189 Given this, the rights associated with patents operate to create a zone 
of protection for the property with a view to prevent encroachment from third 
parties. 
The above narrative posits exclusivity as a non-functional aspect of the 
grant. In doing so, it raises a fundamental question with respect to the correlative 
duty that such exclusivity imposes on the rest of the world. The term ‘correlative 
duty’ is used along the same lines as in property law where the grant of a right 
correlates to a duty of forbearance on others. But neither disclosure nor incentive 
to innovate fully explain the reason for society taking on the correlative obligation 
of forbearance from the property during the term. If disclosure from the 
specification was the only ultimate goal, such disclosure could be better achieved 
in many cases by simply letting the invention fall in the public domain without 
vesting the exclusive rights that are now associated with it. If incentive to innovate 
instead were the only goal, this objective could be served by mechanisms such as a 
prize, which is usually a more risk free one-time reward or recognition in 
celebration of the invention.190 Exclusivity entails more than a prize or a reward, 
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although mechanisms like awards and prizes can also be effective to further the 
objective of encouraging creativity.191  
Specifically, a system styled to monetize the technological benefits of an 
invention could capture most of the functional value of exclusivity and may even 
eliminate some of the associated dangers. Even without patents, an invention that 
is successful in the market can incentivize competition. Inventions protected by 
trade secrets increase competition by reverse engineering or substitution. Such 
competition, in turn, incentivizes the original creator to continue capturing the 
benefits of lead-time advantages. Thus, patent incentives may be redundant in 
some circumstances because innovators may be motivated by market profits even 
without patent incentives. Considering this, the societal preference for the patent 
system at the cost of the forbearance duties leads to a conclusion that, save for the 
clear public benefit paradigm, there is limited justification for the society’s self-
imposition of a duty.  
In considering the framework for rights and duties in patent law, a balance 
between rights and duties is important for the patent system to benefit the public. 
On the one hand, a patent regime that bears a low threshold for patentability may 
result in a large number of patents, likely to the detriment of the public domain. 
While such a system is likely to generate many patents, some with limited 
inventiveness, the value of each individual patent is likely to be limited by the 
lower levels of inventiveness barring exceptional circumstances. Also, the low 
inventiveness threshold makes it easier to find competing substitutes in the 
marketplace. Soon, as each of the patent holders embodying a low threshold of 
inventiveness compete, they will alter the norms relative to the others resulting in a 
rivalrous effect. Alternatively, each patent may be dependent on other patents or 
would have to be bundled together in order to generate adequate market value. 
Each such patent holder’s exclusivity will be circumscribed by other patents. The 
best example of the above problem of low-value patents can be found in the 
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software industry.192 As the number of patents on comparable and substitutable 
technology increases, there is an increasing tendency of corporations to accumulate 
software patents to create a portfolio.193 That is, patent holders consolidate their 
property to maximize the benefits. This results in several patents with lower levels 
of inventiveness representing a potent business tool rather than pockets of 
innovation.  
Under conditions detailed above, the value from each patent (or set thereof) 
is best generated when they are pooled together. Such consolidation can also have 
the benefit of minimizing litigations between holders of patents on comparable 
technologies. Thus, the trend today is to acquire a patent family, which is 
comprised of multiple patents that ultimately protect the same invention.194 Within 
patent families each single patent may have limited value, but together as a patent 
family, they increase the bargaining parity of the patent holder.195 In the 
telecommunication and mobile phone technology business, for example, Samsung 
is understood to hold about 31,524 patent families, Microsoft holds about 8,887, 
and Apple holds about 1,941.196 Under these conditions, the market value of any 
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one single invention is limited, and each patent holder’s exclusivity is 
circumscribed by other patents. Each individual patent embodies limited 
inventiveness because of the low thresholds for protection that prevails in the first 
place. These conditions incentivize a larger number of arguably weaker patents.  
However, the system produces patent portfolios that affect the public 
detrimentally in many important ways.197 For example, recent studies have 
concluded that patent consolidation – grouping patents in “thickets” – increases 
transaction costs, reduces profits that derive from the commercialization of 
innovation and ultimately reduces incentives to innovate.198 The resources required 
to create a portfolio and the consequential increase in bargaining parity of the 
portfolio owner increase the entry barrier, reduce competition in the market, and 
can affect small investors disproportionately.199 The resulting inefficiencies affect 
the public detrimentally because patent protection is bestowed for materials with 
limited innovation.200 In turn, the system results in allocating more power, 
sometimes unfairly, to holders of large patent portfolios.  
A system that rewards innovations with a lower threshold of inventiveness 
can result in accumulating more but can also erode the incentive for inventors to 
reach their maximum creative potential, or worse, can create costs that result in 
blocking follow-on innovations. The protection for minor innovations increases the 
overall need for licensing fees, further impeding innovation. Such a system is a 
detriment to the public domain. Under such circumstances, the incentive of 
exclusive rights in reality becomes a burden on the public, preventing access to 
what might have been otherwise available and accessible to the public. Thus, 
overall, a system that facilitates low threshold of patentability may frustrate the 
purpose of incentivizing invention. Along the same lines, largess in the rights 
package can prevent the system from achieving the targeted objective of 
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incentivizing invention. Under these circumstances, the enormity of the rights 
package can lead to societal discontent with the system.201 
Conversely, a legal system that confers limited power on the patent holder 
may be able to promote access to knowledge and innovation, even though it may 
not be able to capture all innovations under the private domain. The patent systems 
of several developing countries before the enactment of the TRIPS Agreement 
provide good examples.202 Indian patent law allowed only process patents for 
pharmaceutical innovations with a view to improve competition. The process 
patent regime encouraged innovation in different methods of manufacturing known 
pharmaceutical products. This regime resulted in creating competing but similar 
products, increasing competition and thus making the product more accessible.203 
Process innovations became the critical first step for the genesis and growth of the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry. Similarly, a rule prohibiting product patents for 
chemicals was first introduced in the German Patent Law of 1877 to stimulate 
research in alternative methods of producing a product.204 Within thirty years of 
enacting this rule, the German chemical industry became a European leader.205 
German scientists and research workers attributed the success to the various 
process innovations that promoted competition. Interestingly, research in Germany 
attributed the failure of the French chemical industry to the product patent 
system.206 Importantly, providing exclusive rights to the process of production was 
considered a valuable inducement to the discovery of alternative processes.207 The 
resulting increase in diversity of the products benefited consumers. Although 
regimes with only process protection for pharmaceutical drugs have typically been 
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faulted for having lesser rights, they should not be confused as lacking in 
innovation.208  
For the patent system to be most efficient, the system should create a balance 
between rights and obligation.209 As Waldron asserts, “[t]o say that rights are a 
means to an end is one thing; but the correlative proposition that some should be 
forced to bear sacrifices for the greater social good smacks dangerously of 
throwing Christians to the lions for the delectation of Roman society.”210 Justice 
Breyer captured this sentiment in Mayo v. Prometheus, opining,  
[p]atent protection is, after all, a two-edged sword. On the one hand, 
the promise of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives that lead 
to creation, invention, and discovery. On the other hand, that very 
exclusivity can impede the flow of information that might permit, 
indeed spur, invention, by, for example, raising the price of using the 
patented ideas once created, requiring potential users to conduct costly 
and time-consuming searches of existing patents and pending patent 
applications, and requiring the negotiation of complex licensing 
arrangements.211  
Reverberating similar sentiments, Justice Thomas in Myriad emphasized the 
importance of striking a “delicate balance between creating incentives that lead to 
creation, invention, and discovery and impeding the flow of information that might 
permit, indeed spur, invention.”212 Ghosh perhaps couches this concept with more 
precision when he asserts, 
While current intellectual property law assumes the primacy of the 
rights of owners (emphasizing the attachment to legal ownership), 
nuanced consequentialism would recognize the place of the 
intellectual property owner in a network of relationships which create 
duties and obligations. Sensitivity to the consequences of intellectual 
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Merges of a Lockean sense of charity meant for the benefit of the destitute. 
210 Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in 
Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 862 (1993). 
211 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305. 
212 Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2108. 
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property rights is, to quote Professor Sen, sensitive ‘to agencies and 
relations in evaluating what is happening in the world.’213 
CONCLUSION 
This paper attempts to capture the intrinsic core of patent law’s structure as 
delineated in historical sources in an unorthodox manner. It asserts that patent law 
is a misfit within the traditional property regime. While patent law seems to 
struggle to define the outer limits of patent exclusivity, the paper shows how the 
current levels of exclusivity seem to lack support from the doctrinal construct of 
the philosophy behind exclusivity. In doing so, the paper highlights the source of 
exclusive rights to examine how a disconnect between the instrumental elements of 
patents and its targeted objectives has developed over time, leading to a rights-
centric patent system. Understanding the objectives of the system is important for 
patent law to achieve its constitutional destiny. The paper does not propose a 
comprehensive theory of patent law. Instead, it presents the law of contracts as 
embodying a framework within which patent law can fit better. The paper 
concludes that patent law needs a more balanced approach to ensure that the rights 
and obligations inherent to the system work to achieve the targeted objectives.  
                                                          
213 Ghosh, supra note 21, at 815. 
 
